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Abstract: We show that individual investors over-extrapolate from their personal experience 
when making savings decisions. Investors who experience particularly rewarding outcomes from 
saving in their 401(k)—a high average and/or low variance return—increase their 401(k) savings 
rate more than investors who have less rewarding experiences with saving. This finding is not 
driven by aggregate time-series shocks, income effects, rational learning about investing skill, 
investor  fixed  effects,  or  time-varying  investor-level  heterogeneity  that  is  correlated  with 
portfolio  allocations  to  stock,  bond,  and  cash  asset  classes.  We  discuss  implications  for  the 
equity premium puzzle and interventions aimed at improving household financial outcomes. 
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In  this  paper,  we  show  that  individual  investors  over-extrapolate  from  their  personal 
return experience when making savings decisions. Within a given time period, investors who 
experience particularly rewarding outcomes from saving in their 401(k)—a high average and/or a 
low variance rate of return—increase their 401(k) savings rate more than investors who have less 
rewarding experiences with saving.  
These effects are economically and statistically significant. All else equal, a one standard 
deviation  increase  in  an  investor’s  401(k)  rate  of  return  during  year  t  increases  her  401(k) 
savings rate at year-end t by 0.13 percentage points of income. A one standard deviation increase 
in the variance of an investor’s 401(k) return during year t lowers her savings rate by 0.16 
percentage points at year-end t and 0.34 percentage points at year-end t + 1. By comparison, the 
average annual savings rate change in our sample is 0.30 percentage points. 
 T h i s   b e h a v i o r   i s   n o t   e x plained by factors that should affect savings rates. We include 
controls  in  our  regressions  to  capture  aggregate  time  fixed  effects  (such  as  news  about  the 
macroeconomy or expected asset returns), employer-specific time fixed effects, investor fixed 
effects,  investor-level  income  effects,  and  time-varying  investor-level  heterogeneity  that  is 
correlated with portfolio allocations to stock, bond, and cash asset classes. Thus, our results 
indicate that savings decisions are affected by random accidents of personal financial history that 
should not matter to a rational agent. 
Our findings are explained by a model in which investors follow a naïve reinforcement-
learning  heuristic:  increase  weights  on  strategies  in  which  you  have  personally  experienced 
success, even if this past success logically does not predict future success. Erev and Roth (1998) 
find that a reinforcement-learning model outperforms forward-looking models in predicting how 
play evolves in a broad range of economics experiments. Charness and Levin (2003) show that 3 
when  an  (optimal)  Bayesian  updating  rule  conflicts  with  a  reinforcement-learning  rule, 
experimental subjects’ choices shift towards the erroneous option that reinforcement learning 
recommends. Our analysis demonstrates that these laboratory learning dynamics also apply to 
real-world financial decisions.  
The  behavior  we  document  also  has  implications  for  the  equity  premium  puzzle.  If 
reinforcement learning exerts an upward force on aggregate savings rates following a positive 
equity market return (and the reverse for a negative equity market return), then the time-series 
covariance of aggregate consumption growth with equity market returns will be depressed. Choi 
(2006) presents a general equilibrium model where investors behave in such a manner. The 
model generates volatile equity returns, a high equity Sharpe ratio, and low, stable risk-free rates 
that match the historical U.S. data while maintaining smooth aggregate consumption growth and 
low investor risk aversion. 
Although we do not directly observe the entire savings flow of our 401(k) investors, most 
households  have  few  financial  assets  outside  of  their  401(k).  It  is  therefore  likely  that  the 
changes in the 401(k) savings rate we observe reflect changes in the total savings rate for most of 
our sample. When we examine a subset of our sample that has especially strong incentives to 
adjust their total savings rate via the 401(k) contribution margin—households whose marginal 
401(k) contribution garners a matching contribution from their employer—we continue to find 
evidence of return chasing and variance avoidance in the contribution rate.  
Our  results  complement  Barber,  Odean,  and  Strahilevetz  (2004),  who  document 
brokerage investors’ propensity to repurchase individual stocks they previously sold for a gain 
while shunning individual stocks they previously sold for a loss. Barber, Odean and Strahilevetz 
find that purchased stocks previously sold for a gain do not subsequently underperform relative 4 
to benchmarks based on size and book-to-market. Therefore, conditional on making a purchase, 
the propensity to buy previously profitable stocks appears to be welfare-neutral. In our setting, 
however, welfare will generally be affected by changes in an employee’s 401(k) contributions, 
which are tax-advantaged and often garner a matching employer contribution. 
Our results are also related to Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008) and Malmendier and Nagel 
(2007). Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008) show that Finnish investors are more likely to subscribe to 
future IPOs if they experienced high returns in their prior IPO subscriptions, and posit that this 
effect is due to reinforcement learning. Malmendier and Nagel (2007) focus on low-frequency 
responses to variation in return experiences across birth cohorts. They show that cohorts that 
have experienced high stock market returns throughout their lives hold more stocks, and cohorts 
that  have  experienced  high  inflation  throughout  their  lives  hold  fewer  bonds.  We  focus  on 
higher-frequency responses, and the disaggregated structure of our data allows us to show that 
variation in returns within a cohort matters as well.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our 401(k) data. Section II 
explains the framework within which we conduct our empirical estimation. Section III presents 
our results, and Section IV considers alternative interpretations of the results. We conclude in 
Section V by reconciling our results with the disposition effect and discussing how our findings 
might inform policy interventions intended to improve household financial outcomes. 
 
I. Data description 
 O u r   d a t a   c o m e   f r o m   a   l a r g e   b e n e f i t s   r e c o r d -keeping firm. We have panel data for five 
companies that start when our data provider became the plan administrator at each company and 
end at year-end 2000. These data contain the date, amount, and type of every transaction made in 5 
these firms’ 401(k) plans by every participant. In addition, we have year-end cross-sectional 
snapshots  from  1998,  1999,  and  2000  for  all  active  employees  that  include  demographic 
information such as their birth date, hire date, gender, compensation, marital status, and state of 
residence. The year-end cross-sections also contain point-in-time 401(k) information, including 
the contribution rate in effect during the final pay period of the year, total balances, and asset 
allocations. 
Table I gives summary statistics as of year-end 2000 for our companies, which we code-
name Company A through E. Our sample consists of large firms that span a wide range of 
industries. Equally weighting each company, the employees are on average 42.9 years old and 
earn $55,292 a year. By comparison, the March 2001 Current Population Survey reports an 
average age of 40.8 years and average salary of $45,656 among full-time workers in companies 
employing over 1,000 workers and offering some kind of retirement plan. The average 401(k) 
participation rate across the firms is 79%, which is close to the 2000 national participation rate of 
80% found by the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2001), and the average balance of 
participants is $65,964, which is similar to Holden and VanDerhei’s (2001) reported average 
year-end 2000 balance of $61,207 among plans with more than 10,000 participants. 
 A t   e a c h   o f   t h e s e   f i r m s ,   e m p l o y e e s   c a n   c h o o s e  a  contribution  rate  that  is  an  integer 
percentage  of  their  salary.  The  contribution  rate  determines  how  much  of  each  paycheck  is 
deducted and contributed to the plan, and it remains in effect until the employee actively changes 
it. All of our companies offer matching contributions proportional to employee contributions up 
to  a  threshold,  although  Company  C  did  not  introduce  its  match  until  2000.  For  example, 
employees  who  contributed  at  least  3%  of  their  pay  at  Company  B  received  an  additional 
contribution from the company equal to 0.75% their pay. 6 
 T h e   l a r g e   m a j o r i t y   o f   t h e   p l a n s ’   i n v e s t m e n t   options are mutual funds. Every plan offers at 
least  eight  mutual  funds,  including  at  least  one  fixed-income  fund.  The  most  important 
investment option that is not a mutual fund is employer stock, which is offered by four of our 
five plans. In addition, Companies A and D added a self-directed window to their plans in 2000 
and  1999,  respectively.  Self-directed  windows  allow  participants  to  buy  and  sell  individual 
stocks  using  their  401(k)  balances.  We  do  not  observe  transactions  within  the  self-directed 
windows, although we do know the total balances held in the windows at each year-end. Among 
plan participants in Companies A and D, 1.1% and 8.0%, respectively, had any balances in the 
self-directed window at year-end 2000. Conditional upon having any money in the window, 
participants in Companies A and D held on average 34.1% and 28.1% of their 401(k) balances in 
the window, respectively. 
 All of the plans allow changes to the elected contribution rate and asset allocation on a 
daily basis. There is no charge for these changes, which can be made by talking to a benefits 
center representative on the phone during business hours, or by using a touch-tone phone system 
or  the  Internet  24  hours  a  day.  With  these  relatively  straightforward  methods  to  make  free 
changes, the transaction costs seem minimal. 
 
II. Empirical methodology 
Our empirical objective is to estimate the relationship between an individual’s 401(k) 
contribution rate and the first two moments of 401(k) returns. We compute investor i’s monthly 
401(k) returns by weighting each fund’s arithmetic return by the proportion of the portfolio held 
in the fund at the prior month-end. We then define Ri,t as the arithmetic average of the monthly 
401(k)  returns  in  the  one-year  period  t.  Ri,t  is  meant  to  capture  how  lucrative  an  additional 7 
investment in the 401(k) is expected to be if one used only year t’s monthly 401(k) returns to 
infer the future 401(k) return-generating process. It does not necessarily reflect the total percent 
change  in  the  investor’s  wealth  during  t,  which  also  depends  upon  the  pre-existing  401(k) 
balances and the amount and timing of additional contributions to the 401(k). We will control for 
total dollar wealth changes later. We define V
2(Ri,t) as the variance of the twelve monthly returns 
that comprise Ri,t. 
 W e   a d o p t   a   f l e x i b l e   f u n c t i o n a l   f o r m   f o r   t h e  determinants  of  an  individual’s  401(k) 
contribution rate. Let Ci,t be the 401(k) contribution rate, measured as a percent of salary, in 
effect for individual i at year-end t. Then 
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where gi(·) is a function specific to investor i, agei,t is the investor’s age, Xi,t is a vector of other 
control variables defined as of year-end t, and Hi,t is the residual term. By using the contribution 
rate in effect at year-end rather than the total contributions during the year, we can be sure that 
all the information in the explanatory variables was potentially available to the investor before 
she made her choice of the dependent variable. The function gi could vary across investors due to 
unobserved differences (e.g. discount rates, risk aversion, expected income growth, background 
risk)  that  alter  the  optimal  solution  to  the  lifecycle  consumption-investment  problem.  By 
controlling for g, we control for year-over-year contribution changes that would have occurred 
regardless of 401(k) returns. We include contemporaneous returns Ri,t and their variance V
2(Ri,t) 
as explanatory variables. We also include lagged returns and the variance of lagged returns, Ri,t–1 
and V
2(Ri,t–1), to allow for the possibility of a sluggish response to 401(k) performance. At the 
end of this section, we discuss and motivate the specific control variables contained in Xi,t for 
each of our specifications. 8 
We assume that the function gi(agei,t) is locally well-approximated by a first-order Taylor 
expansion  around  the  investor’s  age  at  year-end  1999  (the  middle  year  in  our  sample  of 
contribution rates): 
  ,, 1 9 9 9, , 1 9 9 9 ()( )( )
2
i
ii t ii i t i ga g e ga g e a g e a g e
D
|  .  (2) 
Substituting (2) into (1) and first-differencing yields an equation with an individual fixed 
effect in contribution rate changes: 
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We estimate (3) using least-squares regression. We cluster our standard errors at the company × 
state × year level in case peer effects or information spillovers cause dependence in contribution 
rate changes between coworkers in the same office (Duflo and Saez (2003), Hong, Kubik, and 
Stein (2004), Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2007)).
1 
Contributions to 401(k) plans are usually made with before-tax money. However, some 
of our sample plans allow contributions using after-tax money as well. We add the before-tax 
and (if the plan offers the option) after-tax 401(k) contribution rates in effect for the last pay 
period of 1998, 1999, or 2000 to calculate Ci,t in each of these years. We include employees 
whose contribution rate is zero, provided that they have a positive 401(k) balance.
2 We also 
require that individuals have salaries greater than $20,000 in 1998 because a large fraction of 
those with salaries under $20,000 are part-time employees who are likely to direct less attention 
                                                 
1 Consistent with there being only weak geographic effects in contribution rates, our standard errors are barely 
affected by clustering relative to assuming that all observations are independent. In contrast, the standard errors in 
our portfolio return persistence analysis, presented in Section IV.A, are greatly increased by clustering. 
2 Employees with no balances in the plan are excluded from our analysis because our key explanatory variables, 
which depend on the individual’s rate of return on plan assets, are only defined for those with assets in the plan. 9 
to the 401(k) than full-time employees.
3 In addition, we trim  workers who have a one-year 
income growth observation greater than 30% or less than –20%, which roughly corresponds to 
removing the top 2% and bottom 2% of the income growth distribution. These deleted outliers 
are likely caused by transitions between part-time and full-time work status. 
The presence of the individual fixed effect imposes the requirement that all employees in 
our regressions have two contribution rate change observations. We also need four full years of 
capital gains data in order to estimate the coefficients on both contemporaneous and lagged 'R 
and  'V
2(R). Thus, our sample is limited to workers who have been actively employed at a 
sample firm and continuously enrolled in the 401(k) plan from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 
2000.  Company  E’s  data  start  on  March  31,  1997,  when  our  data  provider  assumed 
administrative services for its plan, so we instead require its workers to be actively employed and 
continuously enrolled in the plan from March 31, 1997 to December 31, 2000.
4 
Finally, we drop individuals if their 1998 salary is high enough that, by contributing at 
the plan’s maximum before-tax contribution rate, they could exceed the $10,000 statutory limit 
on 1998 before-tax 401(k) contributions. The reason we impose this selection rule is that a highly 
paid employee could contribute enough that he hits the before-tax dollar limit midway through 
the year. For the rest of the year, his before-tax contribution rate is frozen at 0 and does not 
reflect his desired contribution rate.
5 
All of our specifications include the log of the employee’s tenure at the company and 
company  dummies  interacted  with  year  dummies  in  the  Xi,t v e c t o r .  T h e  c o m p a n y  ×  y e a r  
                                                 
3 In the March 2001 Current Population Survey, 29.9% of workers who earned less than $20,000 a year worked less 
than 35 hours a week or fewer than 40 weeks per year. Only 5.6% of workers earning between $20,000 and $30,000 
a year satisfied this definition of part-time work. 
4 We assign a zero 401(k) return to Company E employees for the first three months of 1997. Our results are 
qualitatively similar if we drop Company E from the sample. 10 
dummies control for public news that affects optimal contribution rates in aggregate, as well as 
news that is specifically relevant to employees of each company.
6  
Even after controlling for time shocks common to each company, one might worry that 
there is cross-sectional heterogeneity in the time shock that is correlated with 401(k) portfolio 
returns. One candidate for such a correlated shock is the wealth effect from the 401(k) portfolio 
capital gain itself. Thus, in many specifications, we also control for individual wealth effects by 
adding  contemporaneous  and  lagged  401(k)  capital  gains  normalized  by  current  income, 
CapitalGaini,t/Yi,t a n d  CapitalGaini,t–1/Yi,t,  where  CapitalGaini,t i s  i n v e s t o r  i’s  401(k)  dollar 
capital gain during year t and Yi,t is the investor’s annual salary. We calculate CapitalGaini,t by 
taking the difference in balances between year-end t and t – 1 and then subtracting contributions, 
rollovers into the plan, and loan repayments during year t and adding back withdrawals and new 
loans during year t. We normalize CapitalGain (a variable whose unit is dollars) by income 
because  the  dependent  variable  in  our  regressions  (contribution  rate)  is  also  expressed  as  a 
percent of income.  
Another potential concern is that a series of economic news arrived during our sample 
period  that  differentially  affected  the  type of  people  who  tend  to  hold,  say,  relatively  more 
equities (e.g. news about the return to high-skill human capital). Because asset class allocations 
are in turn correlated with portfolio returns, this could confound our identification. To account 
for this possibility, we will control for interactions between year dummies and three variables: 
the dollar amount of the individual’s portfolio held in equities, bonds, and cash at the prior year-
end, all as a fraction of current-year income. In our most comprehensive specification, we also 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 We also drop a small number of Company A employees who are eligible to contribute to the company’s deferred 
compensation plan. 11 
add interactions between year dummies and two variables: the fraction of one’s 401(k) allocated 
to equities and to bonds (also at the prior year-end). 
Unfortunately,  we  cannot  calculate  R  and  V
2(R)—the  portfolio  percentage  return  and 
variance—including returns in the self-directed windows at Companies A and D, since we do not 
observe monthly window balances. The two capital gains variables, however, do include dollar 
gains realized in the window. Our contribution rate results are robust to excluding Companies A 
and D from the sample. 
 
III. Results 
A. Summary statistics 
The  selection  criteria  described  in  Section  II  leave  us  with  49,248  contribution  rate 
change observations on 24,624 employees.
7 Table II reports summary statistics for contribution 
rate  changes  and  our  portfolio r e t u r n  v a r i a b l e s .  F r o m  1 998  to  2000,  the  median  annual 
contribution rate change is zero, and the mean change is 0.30 percentage points of incom e. 
Between 1998 and 1999, 20.6% of our sample investors changed their contribution rate, and 
22.4% changed their contribution rate between 1999 and 2000 (these specific numbers are not 
reported in the table). Over the two years, 35.1% of investors made at least one contribution rate 
change. 
Pooled across 1997 to 2000, the average monthly 401(k) rate of return, R, has a median 
of 0.83% and a mean of 0.99%. Reflecting the dramatic late-1990s bull market and subsequent 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Because of the presence of individual fixed effects, we will ultimately be able to identify only one fixed effect per 
company: the difference between the company’s fixed effect in 2000 and 1999 minus the difference between the 
company’s fixed effect in 1999 and 1998. 
7 At year-end 2000, there were 134,589 active employees at our companies, of whom 100,527 had enrolled in the 
401(k), and 69,286 had been enrolled in the 401(k) since at least January 1, 1997 (or March 31, 1997 in the case of 
Company E). Most of the observations cut from these 69,286 are due to the income cutoff; no employee remaining 
in our final sample could exceed the $10,000 statutory limit on 1998 before-tax contributions by contributing at the 
plan’s maximum contribution rate. 12 
crash, R has a wide distribution; its pooled cross-sectional standard deviation is 1.41%. The 
volatility of monthly portfolio returns, V
2(R), also exhibits wide variation across individuals due 
to differing portfolio shares allocated to equities and particularly to employer stock. The typical 
volatility is quite high, since many plan participants held significant amounts of their employer’s 
stock.  Our  companies’  monthly  stock  returns  generally  experienced  annualized  standard 
deviations well over 100% during the sample period. The dollar capital gain normalized by 
income, CapitalGain /Y,  has  an  economically  narrower  range because most investors’ 401(k) 
balances are modest compared to their income. The mean and median of CapitalGain/Y are 0.09 
and 0.04, respectively, and its standard deviation is 0.30.  
 
B. Main contribution rate regressions 
  Table  III,  Panel  A  presents  the  coefficients  from  estimating  equation  (3)  on  the  full 
sample. The first column shows estimates from the baseline specification, which includes first-
differenced contemporaneous and lagged 401(k) return and volatility, log tenure, and company × 
year dummies as explanatory variables. We find that a one standard deviation increase in year t’s 
average monthly return causes the 401(k) contribution rate at year-end t to rise by 1.41 × 0.0933 
= 0.13 percentage points of income, an effect that is significant at the 1% level. There is no 
further increase in year t + 1. 
In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in year t volatility causes the contribution 
rate at year-end t to fall by 43.80 × 0.0042 = 0.18 percentage points. The contribution rate falls 
an additional 0.17 percentage points by year-end t + 1. Both the contemporaneous and lagged 
variance-avoidance effects are significant at the 1% level.  13 
To  assess  the  economic  significance  of  these  effects,  recall  that  the  average  annual 
contribution rate increase is 0.30 percentage points of income. Thus, the 0.13 percentage point 
effect of 401(k) returns and the 0.35 percentage point two-year effect of volatility are substantial 
relative to the mean. 
Because we are including company × year dummies in our regression, we are controlling 
for public news about expected asset returns and news specifically relevant to employees of each 
company. Holding fixed news, an investor should not update his beliefs about the future returns 
of his 401(k)’s investment options differently based upon how well his own portfolio did. Yet we 
find that employees do invest more in their 401(k) when their own portfolio performance was 
relatively good. Because we are including individual fixed effects in our regression, we are also 
controlling for time-invariant investor  heterogeneity—such  as  risk  aversion,  time  preference, 
human capital, etc.—that may affect contribution rates. 
Our results are robust to controls for cross-sectional heterogeneity in the time shocks. The 
second column of Table III shows that controlling for wealth effects via the contemporaneous 
and lagged normalized dollar capital gains in the 401(k) barely affects the coefficients on return 
and volatility. The third column of Table III adds controls for the dollar amount held in equities, 
bonds, and cash at the prior year-end, and the fourth column adds controls for the fraction of the 
401(k) held in equities or bonds at the prior year-end. Even with these additional controls, we 
continue to estimate large and statistically significant return chasing and variance avoidance, and 
the point estimates remain similar to those in the baseline specification of column 1. In the most 
comprehensive specification, we find that a one standard deviation increase in portfolio returns 
in year t increases the 401(k) contribution rate in year t by 0.12 percentage points, and a one 
standard deviation increase in the volatility of returns in year t decreases the 401(k) contribution 14 
rate by 0.16 percentage points at year-end t and by another 0.18 percentage points at year-end t + 
1. 
We  perform  several  additional  robustness  checks  for  our  specification.  First,  we  test 
whether our results are symmetric. In untabulated regressions, we use splines to allow the return 
and variance effects to vary depending on whether the return or variance in a given year is 
greater than or less than the prior year’s realization. In every case, we find that the asymmetries 
are statistically and economically insignificant. We also find no asymmetry in the return effect 
around the S&P 500 benchmark return.  
These findings are consistent with individual investors following a naïve reinforcement 
learning heuristic: investors expect that investments in which they personally experienced past 
rewards  will  be  rewarding  in  the  future,  whether  or  not  such  a  belief  is l o g i c a l l y  j u s t i f i e d .  
Reinforcement learning models have had success in predicting subject choices in experiments 
(Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998). Reinforcement learning is often a sensible heuristic 
because future rewards are positively correlated with recent rewards in many domains. We show 
in Section IV.A that this relationship does not hold true in 401(k) investing. 
Do 401(k) contribution rate changes reflect total savings rate changes? We test this by 
restricting  our  sample  to  participants  who  at  year-end  1998  were  contributing  less  than  the 
threshold to which their employer would provide matching contributions. These participants face 
instantaneous risk-free marginal returns to saving in their 401(k) of 25% to 100%. It is difficult 
to  imagine  that  there  are  alternative  investment  vehicles  that  offer  comparable  risk-adjusted 
returns. Therefore, these employees have especially strong incentives to adjust their consumption 
expenditures exclusively through their 401(k) contribution rate. Because Company C did not 
have a match until 2000, its participants are excluded from this analysis. 15 
The results are in Table III, Panel B. The sample restriction causes us to lose 84% of the 
sample, which leads to large increases in the standard errors.
8 Nevertheless, the coefficients on 
the key return and variance variables remain economically large and statistically significant, with 
higher (absolute value) point estimates in most cases. Comparing Panels A and B, the coefficient 
on  'Ri,t i n c r e a s e s  b y  a n  a v e r a g e  o f  a b o u t  5 0  p e r cent  across  all  four  specifications,  and  the 
magnitude of the coefficients on 'V
2(Ri,t) increase by more than 80 percent. We conclude that 
the effect is at least as strong among these infra-match investors as it is among the whole sample. 
Since these investors should be using the 401(k) as their marginal savings vehicle, these results 
provide evidence that our findings extend to the broader consumption-savings decision. 
 
C. Interactions with age and salary 
A key feature of reinforcement learning models is the “Power Law of Practice”: reactions 
to stimuli are large initially and then attenuate as the stock of reinforcements increases and the 
marginal stimulus constitutes a smaller proportional addition to the stock (Roth and Erev, 1995). 
Reinforcement learning therefore predicts that the contribution rate of young investors is more 
responsive to their personal portfolio performance than that of old investors. 
The  regression  in  the  first  column  of  Table  IV  tests  this  prediction  by  interacting 
contemporaneous  change  in  401(k)  return  and  volatility,  'R a n d  'V
2(R),  with  de-meaned 
investor age at year-end 1998. Since Table III shows that lagged volatility change also affects 
contribution rate changes, we include interactions of this lag with investor age as well. We do not 
include  the  lagged  return  change,  which  we  found  to  be  insignificant  in  Table  III.
9 W e  
                                                 
8 We drop the lagged return change variable from Panel B, since it was insignificant in Panel A. Inclusion of that 
variable here does not qualitatively affect the point estimates, but does increase the standard errors.  
9If we include interactions for lagged return changes, then the point estimates on the other coefficients are not 
qualitatively affected, but there is an increase in the standard errors for the contemporaneous return interactions. 16 
acknowledge that age may be a proxy for many different things, so the interactions with age may 
be capturing elements other than learning. We interpret our results here with that caveat in mind.  
For brevity, we show only the most comprehensive regression specification that controls 
for contemporaneous and lagged normalized CapitalGain, asset class balance × year dummies, 
and asset class portfolio share × year dummies. We indeed find that both return chasing and 
variance avoidance attenuate with age. The age interaction with the contemporaneous change in 
401(k) return is significant at the 1% level, as are the age interactions with contemporaneous and 
lagged volatility changes, which are both significant at the 1% level and of similar magnitudes. 
Each additional decade of age reduces return chasing by 19% and variance avoidance by 30% 
relative to the tendencies found in a 21 year old. 
Even though responsiveness to portfolio returns decreases with age, investors nonetheless 
exhibit reinforcement learning behavior for most of their lives. The point estimates indicate that 
return chasing continues until age 74.
10 Variance avoidance diminishes more swiftly, but both 
contemporaneous and lagged variance-avoidance persists through age 54. 
One  might  suspect  that  higher-income  investors  would  be  less  prone  to  naïve 
reinforcement learning, since income is a proxy for financial sophistication. The second column 
of Table IV examines whether this is the case by interacting contemporaneous and lagged 401(k) 
return change and volatility change with 1998 log salary. Surprisingly, income has no significant 
attenuating  effect  on  reinforcement  learning  tendencies,  at  least  within  the  low-to-moderate 
income investor population in our regressions. 
The final column of Table IV interacts return and volatility changes with both age and 
log income. We see that the conclusions drawn from the first two columns are robust to allowing 17 
this simultaneous interaction. Age continues to attenuate the force of reinforcement learning, 
whereas income does not, and the point estimates of the interactions are nearly identical to those 
in the first two columns. 
 
IV. Alternative explanations 
 W e   n o w   c o n s i d e r   a l t e r n a t i v e   m e c h a n i s m s   t h at  could  generate  the  return-chasing  and 
variance-avoidance results presented above. 
 
A. Learning about investing skill 
Investors who experience high 401(k) returns with low variance may be learning that 
they have greater skill at 401(k) asset allocation than their coworkers who experience low 401(k) 
returns with high variance. Therefore, it may be rational for investors with better performance to 
allocate more to their 401(k).
11 While the vast majority of research in finance would suggest that 
such skill is rare among individual investors,
12 it is still useful to perform a direct test in our 
sample. 
 I f   a   h i g h   4 0 1 ( k )   r e t u r n   i s   a   s i g n   o f   h i g h   401(k)  investing  skill,  then  we  should  see 
persistence in 401(k) portfolio alphas over time. We regress an investor’s portfolio alpha in year 
t on her portfolio alpha in year t – 1, where t = 1998, 1999, and 2000. Three-factor alphas are 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Age is de-meaned in Table IV to facilitate interpretation of the uninteracted 'R and 'V
2(R) coefficients. The mean 
age  at  year-end  1998  in  the  regression  sample  is  43.4. T h e r e f o r e ,  r e t u r n  c h a s i n g  drops  to  zero  at  age  43.4  + 
0.0808/0.0264 × 10 = 74.0 in column 1. 
11 Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009) find that investors stop holding both stocks and bonds after realizing poor 
mutual fund performance. Because Companies A and E do not offer cash as a 401(k) investment option, one may 
wonder if our performance-chasing results are caused by investors reducing their 401(k) contributions because they 
simply want to reduce their risky asset share, rather than because they are shying away from 401(k) investing per se. 
However, our performance-chasing results are robust to restricting the sample to Companies B, C, and D, which 
offer cash funds in their 401(k).  
12 See, for example, Benartzi (2001) for evidence that rank-and-file employees do not have the ability to predict their 
employer’s stock return. 18 
calculated by regressing monthly excess portfolio returns on the excess market return and the 
Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market factor returns. Four-factor alpha regressions 
also  include  Kenneth  French’s  momentum  factor  (MOM)  returns.  Across  our  entire  sample 
period, the average alphas are approximately zero: a portfolio that equally weights participant 
portfolios yields a –1 basis point per month (t-statistic = –0.03) three-factor alpha and an 11 basis 
point per month (t-statistic = 0.35) four-factor alpha. 
We estimate each persistence regression in two different ways: first, using each investor’s 
alpha  as  a  linear  predictor  of  his  or  her  subsequent  year’s  alpha,  and  second,  allowing  the 
predictive effect of an investor’s alpha to differ depending on whether it is positive or negative. 
Investors’ asset allocations are constrained by the investment options offered in their company’s 
401(k) plan, so it may be sensible to only compare performance relative to other investors in the 
same company. Therefore, we include company × year dummies as explanatory variables.
13 We 
cluster  our  regression  standard  errors  by  company  ×  year  ×  employee  state  of  residence  to 
account  for  the  fact  that  asset  allocations  (and  hence  alphas)  in  our  sample  may  not  be 
independently chosen within a company locality. 
Table V shows the results of these portfolio performance persistence regressions. We see 
that, if anything, a good 401(k) portfolio performance this year predicts poor performance the 
following year. Three-factor alphas are negatively serially correlated, while the four-factor alpha 
exhibits positive serial correlation that is both statistically and economically insignificant. When 
we split the alphas into negative and positive cases, we again find no significant evidence of 
persistent skill. Under the three-factor model, positive alphas predict lower subsequent alphas, 
while under the four-factor model, negative alphas predict higher subsequent alphas.  
                                                 
13 Regressions without company × year fixed effects yield qualitatively similar results on alpha persistence. 19 
Overall,  there  is  no  empirical  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  returns-chasing  and 
variance-avoidance are driven by rational learning about one’s own investing skill. 
 
B. Rebalancing 
There is another potential alternative explanation for our finding that 401(k) contribution 
changes  are  positively  related  to p o r t f o l i o  r e t u r n s :  if  an  investor  has  significant  non-401(k) 
financial assets, then a positive correlation between 401(k) and non-401(k) asset returns could 
produce  the  appearance  of  return  chasing  due  to  rebalancing.  For  example,  suppose  all 
households followed a rule of maintaining a fixed dollar amount in non-401(k) assets (a buffer 
stock). Then a high 401(k) return would be associated with a high non-401(k) return, which 
would cause high-return households to increase 401(k) contributions and increase consumption 
out of non-401(k) assets to bring non-401(k) asset values back down to baseline. 
This story, however, is inconsistent with some of our other findings. Such a rebalancing 
effect should diminish as non-401(k) financial assets get smaller, since the fraction of income 
required to restore the non-401(k) balance to its steady-state level diminishes for a given percent 
return. Therefore, the rebalancing story predicts that apparent return chasing would be weakest 
among  the  young,  who  have  few  financial  assets,  and  strongest  among  the  old.  The  results 
presented  above  in  Section  III.C,  however,  showed  that  the  empirical  pattern  is  exactly  the 
opposite: return chasing decreases with age. 
Furthermore, most 401(k) households have minimal liquid wealth outside of their 401(k) 
with which to engage in rebalancing. In the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, among 401(k)-
holding households earning between $20,000 and $70,000 a year—a sample roughly comparable 
to the one we use in our analysis—the median household has gross non-retirement financial 20 
assets equal to only 2.1 months of income, 76% of which is held in checking, savings, or money 
market accounts.
14 It is only at the 82nd percentile that households have one year’s income in 
gross non-retirement financial assets. These figures probably overstate outside asset holdings in 
our sample because the generosity of our 401(k) plans’ early withdrawal and loan provisions 
substantially mitigates the need for a precautionary wealth stock outside the 401(k).
15 
Finally, the rebalancing channel cannot explain the robust variance-avoidance we observe 
among our investors. 
 
V. Conclusion 
We find that individual investors chase their own historical returns and shy away from 
their own historical return variance when making 401(k) savings rate decisions. This behavior 
cannot be accounted for by aggregate time fixed effects, employer-specific time fixed effects, 
investor fixed effects, investor-level income effects, or time-varying investor-level heterogeneity 
that is correlated with portfolio allocations to stock, bond, and cash asset classes. The observed 
patterns are consistent with a naïve reinforcement learning heuristic: assets in which one has 
personally experienced success are expected to be successful in the future. 
These results contrast with the well-documented reluctance to sell assets that have fallen 
below their purchase price (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998), which induces contrarian 
trading  behavior  with  respect  to o n e ’ s  p e r s o n a l  r e t u r n  h i s t o r y.  This  “disposition  effect”  is 
                                                 
14 W e  c o u n t  C D s ,  b o n d s ,  s a v i n g s  b o n d s ,  p u b l i c l y  t r a d e d  stock,  mutual  funds,  cash  value  life  insurance,  other 
managed accounts, transactions accounts, and miscellaneous assets as non-retirement financial assets. 
15 Table I shows that all of the plans allow participants to take hardship withdrawals from and loans against their 
401(k) plan balances, and only one does not allow non-hardship withdrawals. These provisions make 401(k) savings 
in the companies we study more liquid than for the typical 401(k) participant at the time. The U.S. Department of 
Labor (2003) reports that in 2000, 40% of full-time employees with savings and thrift plans in private industry were 
not allowed to take early in-service withdrawals for any reason, and an additional 29% could only take hardship 
withdrawals. The Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2001) reports that 14% of plans did not permit loans in 
2000. 21 
anomalous because the asset’s purchase price is investor-specific and already sunk, and hence 
should not affect the selling decision in the absence of capital gains taxes.
16 The most common 
explanation  for  the  disposition  effect  is  that p r o s p e c t  t h e o r y  p r e f e r e n c e s  ( K a h n e m a n  a n d  
Tversky, 1979) cause investors to experience disutility from making a sale below the “reference 
price” at which they bought the asset (Barberis and Xiong (2008a,b)), and to be risk-seeking for 
assets that are mentally classified in the loss domain. 
We conjecture that the absence of contrarian behavior in our data is due to two factors. 
First,  changing  one’s  ongoing  savings  rate  does  not  affect  whether  past  investments  are 
psychologically “booked” as a loss. Second, because the 401(k) investments we observe are 
accumulated through periodic asset purchases that are automatically made each payroll period, it 
is  difficult  for  the  investor  to  mentally  establish  a  single  reference  price  below  which  his 
investment is in the loss domain. Therefore, the tendency to increase one’s stake in investments 
which are underwater is attenuated.  
Reinforcement learning is a robust phenomenon because it is often a sensible heuristic; 
future rewards are positively correlated with recent rewards in many domains. Our application 
may be a rare exception, since we find no evidence that superior performance is persistent. With 
the exception of momentum returns over some horizons, the finance literature has found scant 
evidence of persistent alphas in public market investing, so we should not expect persistent 
alphas among 401(k) participants. Employers and policymakers could try to educate individuals 
about this counterintuitive fact. However, financial education is costly and has often been found 
to be ineffective (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002), Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 
(2007, 2008), Cole and Shastry (2007)). Instead, institutional designers may have success in 
                                                 
16 Introducing capital gains taxes should make investors more prone to sell losers (Constantinides (1984)), which is 
the opposite of what they actually do. 22 
mitigating  the  impact  of  reinforcement  learning  by  muting  the  reinforcements  themselves, 
perhaps  by  making  short-horizon  historical  performance  less  salient  in  disclosure  forms  and 
account  statements.  Finally,  our results  provide  another  argument  for  programs  that  provide 
prominent  (non-zero)  defaults  for  savings  levels  (Madrian  and  Shea  (2004),  Choi,  Laibson, 
Madrian,  and  Metrick  (2004))  and  savings  changes  (Benartzi  and  Thaler ( 2 0 0 4 ) ) .  S e n s i b l e  
defaults combat perverse investment behaviors both by acting as implicit carriers of advice and 
by utilizing investor inertia to effect sensible outcomes. 
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Government Printing Office. Table I. Company Descriptions, Year-End 2000 
Characteristic  Company A  Company B  Company C  Company D  Company E 
Industry  Manufacturing  Healthcare  Manufacturing  Utility  Electronics 
Number of employees  Over 20,000  Over 50,000  Over 20,000  Over 10,000  Over 10,000 
Average age  44.1  42.7  44.6  43.5  39.5 
Average salary  $51,835  $33,156  $66,700  $70,069  $54,702 
% male  80%  19%  Data unavailable  83%  65% 
% married    56%  55%  75%  Data unavailable  50% 
401(k) participation rate  80%  61%  86%  85%  83% 
Average 401(k) balance  $80,740  $19,501  $81,122  $88,033  $60,426 
Maximum contribution rate  
(% of salary) 
10% before-tax, 14% after-
tax, 14% combined 
15% before-tax  20% before-tax  25% before-tax and after-
tax combined 
1998-99: 14% before-tax
2000: 16% before-tax 
Employer match  25% to 100% (varies by 
location) of first 6% of pay 
25% of first 3%  
of pay 
None until 2000, then  
100% of first 1% of pay, 
50% of next 4% of pay 
50% of first 7% or 8% of 
pay (depends on union 
membership) 
100% of first 3% of pay, 
50% of next 3% of pay 
Investment funds  1998: 3 bond, 3 large-cap, 
1 mid-cap, 1 small-cap, 3 
overseas, employer stock. 
1999: Added 1 bond, 1 
large-cap, 1 overseas. 
2000: Added 1 overseas 
and self-directed window. 
1 cash, 1 bond, 3 pre-
mix, 2 large-cap, 1 
small-cap, 1 overseas, 
employer stock 
1 cash, 3 bond, 4 pre-
mix, 8 large-cap, 5 mid-
cap, 3 small-cap, 8 
overseas, 3 sector, 
employer stock 
1998: 1 cash, 1 bond, 3 
pre-mix, 1 large-cap, 1 
mid-cap, 1 overseas, 
employer stock 
1999: Added 1 small cap, 
self-directed window 
1 bond, 3 pre-mix, 5 
large-cap, 1 small-cap, 1 
overseas 
Number of outstanding  
loans allowed 
1 home loan, 1 general 
purpose loan 
1  2  2  2 
Hardship withdrawals   Allowed  Allowed  Allowed  Allowed  Allowed 
Non-hardship withdrawal 
rules before age 59½ 
1 withdrawal allowed per 
month from after-tax, 
rollover, vested company 
match, and profit-share 
balances  
After-tax and vested 
employer contribution 
money from 
grandfathered plans can 
be withdrawn at any time
Not allowed  After-tax and vested 
employer match money 
can be withdrawn at any 
time 
After-tax and rollover 
balances can be 
withdrawn at any time 
 Table II. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the regression sample on the year-over-year change in the 
contribution rate effective during the last pay cycle of December, 401(k) returns, and annual 401(k) 
dollar capital gains normalized by annual income. Each data point in the distributions represents a 
separate investor-calendar year combination. The contribution rate change statistics are from year-end 
1998 through year-end 2000. The 401(k) return and capital gains statistics are from year-end 1997 
through year-end 2000. Capital gains from 1998 to 2000 are normalized by contemporaneous year 
income, and capital gains in 1997 are normalized by 1998 income due to the lack of 1997 income data.  
 
 A n n u a l  
contribution 
rate change 
('C) 
Average 
monthly 
return 
(R) 
Monthly return 
standard 
deviation 
(V(R)) 
Monthly 
return 
variance 
(V
(R)) 
Annual capital 
gains/annual 
income 
(CapitalGain/Y) 
Maximum  20%  10.63%  20.74%  430.10  7.87 
99
th percentile  9%  6.79%  14.89%  221.69  1.20 
90
th percentile  2%  2.13%  8.85%  78.24  0.31 
75
th percentile  0%  1.47%  6.02%  36.28  0.13 
50
th percentile  0%  0.83%  3.97%  15.73  0.04 
25
th percentile  0%  0.46%  2.20%  4.85  0.00 
10
th percentile  0%  -0.46%  0.12%  0.01  -0.08 
1
st percentile  -9%  -2.24%  0.01%  0.00  -0.56 
Minimum  -20%  -6.89%  0.01%  0.00  -8.49 
          
Mean  0.30%  0.99%  4.44%  30.69  0.09 
Std. deviation  2.47%  1.41%  3.32%  43.80  0.30 
 Table III. Regressions of Contribution Rate Changes on Portfolio Returns and Variance 
This table presents coefficients from estimating regression equation (3). Panel A contains results for 
the full sample, and Panel B restricts the sample to those whose contribution rate at year-end 1998 was 
below the match threshold. The dependent variable is the year-over-year change, in 1999 and 2000, in 
the contribution rate effective during the last pay cycle of December. The ' operator is for year-over-
year changes. The subscript i indexes investors, and t indexes years. Ri,t is average monthly 401(k) 
percent return, V
2(Ri,t) is 401(k) monthly return variance, CapitalGaini,t is 401(k) dollar capital gain, 
Yi,t is annual salary, and Tenurei,t is the number of years since original hire at the end of year t. The last 
three  table  rows  indicate  whether  the  regression  includes  company  ×  year  dummies,  asset  class 
(equities, bonds, or cash) balances at the prior year-end normalized by income interacted with year 
dummies, and the share of the 401(k) in equities or bonds at the prior year-end interacted with year 
dummies.  The  estimates  are  obtained  by  differencing  equation  (3)  and  running  a  least  squares 
regression. Standard errors from this differenced regression, clustered by company × employeeﾒ’s state 
of residence in 1998, are in parentheses below the point estimates. 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
'Ri,t  0.0933**  0.0939**  0.0995**  0.0847** 
 ( 0 . 0 1 4 6 )   ( 0 . 0 1 9 2 )   ( 0 . 0 1 9 5 )   ( 0 . 0 2 6 9 )  
'Ri,tﾖ–1  0.0107  -0.0026  -0.0122  -0.0119 
 (0.0186)  (0.0305)  (0.0323)  (0.0321) 
'V
2(Ri,t) -0.0042**  -0.0042**  -0.0043**  -0.0037** 
 (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0010)  (0.0009) 
'V
2(Ri,tﾖ–1) -0.0039**  -0.0039**  -0.0045*  -0.0040* 
 (0.0014)  (0.0015)  (0.0018)  (0.0017) 
'CapitalGaini,t/Yi,t)   0.0205  -0.2443*  -0.1849
+ 
  ( 0 . 0 7 9 2 )   ( 0 . 0 9 9 2 )   ( 0 . 0 9 9 1 )  
'CapitalGaini,tﾖ–1/Yi,t)   0.1833  0.5435
+  0.5727
+ 
  ( 0 . 2 1 6 5 )   ( 0 . 2 9 6 0 )   ( 0 . 2 9 4 6 )  
'Log(Tenurei,t) -1.1663  -1.2711  -1.0891  -1.2210 
 (0.9470)  (0.9965)  (0.9756)  (0.9942) 
Company × Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Balance × Year controls  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Share × Year controls  No  No  No  Yes 
N  49,248  49,248  49,248  49,248  
Panel B: Employees contributing below employer match threshold at year-end 1998 
'Ri,t  0.1559**  0.1392**  0.1511**  0.0889
+ 
 ( 0 . 0 4 1 7 )   ( 0 . 0 4 2 7 )   ( 0 . 0 4 5 1 )   ( 0 . 0 5 0 7 )  
'V
2(Ri,t) -0.0072*  -0.0070*  -0.0071**  -0.0069** 
 (0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.0026)  (0.0024) 
'V
2(Ri,tﾖ–1) -0.0043  -0.0050
+ - 0 . 0 0 4 6   - 0 . 0 0 7 5 *  
 (0.0030)  (0.0029)  (0.0028)  (0.0033) 
'CapitalGaini,t/Yi,t)   0.4521  0.2230  0.3264 
  ( 0 . 2 9 0 0 )   ( 0 . 3 3 1 2 )   ( 0 . 3 3 3 7 )  
'CapitalGaini,tﾖ–1/Yi,t)   0.8943  1.5746*  1.6414* 
  ( 0 . 7 8 5 0 )   ( 0 . 6 7 8 9 )   ( 0 . 6 8 6 6 )  
'Log(Tenurei,t) -1.4529  -0.9717  -1.1692  -1.0817 
 (1.3226)  (1.2792)  (1.3939)  (1.3602) 
Company × Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Balance × Year controls  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Share × Year controls  No  No  No  Yes 
N  8,050  8,050  8,050  8,050 
+ Significant at 10% level. * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
 Table IV. Regressions of Contribution Rate Changes on  
Portfolio Returns and Variance Interacted With Age and Income 
This table presents coefficients from estimating a variant of regression equation (3). The dependent 
variable is the year-over-year change, in 1999 and 2000, in the contribution rate effective during the 
last pay cycle of December. The ' operator is for year-over-year changes. The subscript i indexes 
investors, and t indexes years. Ri,t is average monthly 401(k) percent return, Agei,1998 is de-meaned age 
at  year-end  1998,  log(Yi,1998)  is  de-meaned  log  1998  salary,  and  V
2(Ri,t)  is  401(k)  monthly  return 
variance.  All  regressions  control  for  contemporaneous  and  lagged  401(k)  dollar  capital  gains 
normalized by annual income (CapitalGain/Y), tenure at company, company × year dummies, 401(k) 
asset  class  (equities,  bonds,  or  cash)  balances  at  the  prior  year-end  normalized  by  income  and 
interacted with year dummies, and the share of 401(k) balances in equities or bonds at the prior year-
end interacted with year dummies. The estimates are obtained by differencing the regression equation 
and running a least squares regression. Standard errors from this differenced regression, clustered by 
company × employeeﾒ’s state of residence in 1998, are in parentheses below the point estimates. 
 
'R,t  0.0808**  0.0932**  0.0831** 
 ( 0 . 0 2 2 9 )   ( 0 . 0 2 6 5 )   ( 0 . 0 2 3 6 )  
'Ri,t × Agei,1998/10  -0.0264**    -0.0257** 
 ( 0 . 0 0 7 2 )     ( 0 . 0 0 7 5 )  
'Ri,t × log(Yi,1998)    0.0403*  0.0391* 
   ( 0 . 0 1 7 5 )   ( 0 . 0 1 7 8 )  
'V
2(Ri,t) -0.0032**  -0.0036**  -0.0031** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0007) 
'V
2(Ri,t) ×Agei,1998/10 0.0029**    0.0029** 
 (0.0005)    (0.0005) 
'V
2(Ri,t) × log(Yi,1998)   0.6547  0.3132 
  ( 1 . 2 7 9 2 )   ( 1 . 2 8 1 1 )  
'V
2(Ri,tﾖ–1) -0.0035**  -0.0039**  -0.0036** 
 (0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0013) 
'V
2(Ri,tﾖ–1) × Agei,1998/10 0.0033**    0.0033** 
 (0.0008)    (0.0008) 
'V
2(Ri,tﾖ–1) × log(Yi,1998)   2.4023  2.0345 
  ( 1 . 8 3 1 0 )   ( 1 . 8 5 1 0 )  
CapitalGain/Y controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Tenure controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Company × Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Balance × Year controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Share × Year controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  49,248  49,248  49,248 
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level.  
  Table V. 401(k) Return Performance Persistence 
This table shows the results of regressing year t 401(k) portfolio alpha on year t ﾖ– 1 401(k) portfolio 
alpha, where t goes from 1998 to 2000. Columns 2 and 4 interact t ﾖ– 1 alpha with dummies for whether 
that alpha is positive or negative. The 3-factor alpha controls for the market return, size effect, and 
book-to-market effect. The 4-factor alpha also controls for stock price momentum. Standard errors, 
clustered by company × year × employeeﾒ’s state of residence in year t, are in parentheses below the 
point estimates. 
 
  3-factor alpha  4-factor alpha 
Dtﾖ–1  -0.1722**    0.0213   
 ( 0 . 0 5 2 0 )     ( 0 . 0 6 1 4 )    
Dtﾖ–1 × (Dtﾖ–1   0)   -0.2389**    0.0912 
   (0.0535)    (0.0859) 
Dtﾖ–1 × (Dtﾖ–1 < 0)    0.0276    -0.2061* 
   (0.0488)    (0.0881) 
Company × Year 
dummies 
Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
N  73,872  73,872  73,872  73,872 
 